Salesforce has announced another security control for the legacy SOAP API login() operation. From 15 December 2026 in sandboxes and 31 January 2027 in production, a call can be blocked when it relies on username and password alone and the org or user profile has an excessively broad login IP range.

This is not a blanket change to every SOAP integration. It applies to a specific combination of authentication method, network configuration and missing protection. Salesforce has also provided a release update with test-run mode, giving platform teams a practical way to find failures before enforcement.

The dates, thresholds and product behaviour in this article are confirmed Salesforce guidance. The prioritisation and operating recommendations are the Ostrelis view.

What Salesforce is changing

A SOAP login() client normally authenticates with a Salesforce username and password, with a user security token appended to the password when the request comes from outside a trusted network. A sufficiently broad trusted IP range can currently allow some calls to succeed without that token.

Salesforce now defines a broad range as one that exceeds 16,777,216 IPv4 addresses—larger than a /8 CIDR block—or more than 299 IPv6 addresses. The range can be configured at org level under Network Access or on the integration user’s profile under Login IP Ranges.

After enforcement reaches the org, an affected request without a security token will fail. Salesforce says Login History records the attempt with the failure reason TOKEN_REQUIRED and result code 1502, although the calling application can receive only a generic authentication error.

Salesforce describes a staged rollout. Treat the published dates as the points from which enforcement starts, not as a reason to wait for an org-specific notice.

Are you affected?

Three conditions need to be present together:

  • The client authenticates through the SOAP API login() operation.
  • A broad trusted IP range exists at org level, on the user’s profile, or both.
  • The request uses username and password without an API security token and without mutual TLS.

If an integration already uses OAuth, this particular control is not its issue. If it uses SOAP login() but already appends a current security token, the new requirement should not change that authentication pattern. A narrow IP range is also outside the stated broad-range condition.

Do not infer safety from a successful login today. The point of the release update is to test the future behaviour. Equally, do not assume every entry labelled SOAP is affected: an OAuth access token can be used for subsequent SOAP API calls without invoking the retiring login() operation.

Start with configuration and login evidence

Review Network Access and the Login IP Ranges on profiles assigned to integration users. Record ranges and their purpose before changing them. A range covering most of the internet may have been added years ago to stop authentication failures, but it also weakens the network signal used in the login decision.

In Login History, Salesforce advises looking for Login Subtype “SOAP API”, an API Type of SOAP Enterprise, SOAP Partner or SOAP Tooling, and application “N/A”. “Other Apex API” and “Partner Product” can appear as login types. Use the username, source IP, timestamp and business schedule to identify the caller.

API Total Usage event logs can add stronger technical evidence. Salesforce says API_FAMILY = SOAP, API_RESOURCE = login and an empty CONNECTED_APP_ID indicate SOAP login(). Reconcile this with the integration register, middleware schedules and supplier documentation. A quiet monthly or quarter-end job can be missed by a short observation window.

For every candidate, capture its business purpose, owner, integration user, environment, source system, frequency, supplier or code repository and recovery route. Unowned authentication is the first problem to resolve.

Use the release update as a controlled test

Salesforce says the “SOAP API login() Security Remediation” release update is available in Setup. Its test-run mode simulates enforcement and can be disabled to revert the test behaviour.

Start in a representative sandbox or non-production org. Coordinate the window with the external-system owner, enable test run, execute the integration and inspect both the client-side error and Salesforce Login History. Test scheduled and manual routes, not just a connectivity button. Confirm that downstream monitoring produces an actionable alert.

A test failure is useful evidence, but a successful test is not proof that the inventory is complete. Run through every known SOAP login user and include low-frequency jobs. Keep a simple results record so a passing path is not repeatedly investigated.

Choose a short-term response deliberately

Salesforce documents two bridge options where migration cannot finish before enforcement.

Add the user’s API security token. The client appends the token to the password in its login request. This can require configuration or supplier support, secure storage and an operational process for token resets. Treat the combined credential as a secret. A password reset can invalidate the token and create another dependency that somebody must own.

Narrow the login IP range. Replace an excessively broad allowlist with specific, justified source ranges. This may avoid a client-code change, but it requires confidence about outbound addresses, resilience paths and supplier networks. Do not tighten production ranges from an assumed address list; validate every legitimate route first and retain a rollback plan.

Mutual TLS is also identified by Salesforce as a protection outside the affected username-and-password-only combination. It is an architectural option, not a quick checkbox: certificate ownership, renewal and client support need to be designed and tested.

Do not mistake a bridge for the destination

This security-token requirement and the SOAP login() retirement are separate changes. Salesforce still plans to retire login() in API versions 31.0–64.0 with Summer ’27. Adding a token or narrowing a range may keep an affected call working through the December or January control, but it does not remove the 2027 deadline.

Salesforce recommends moving towards External Client Apps and OAuth. The correct OAuth flow depends on whether a person is present, how the external system stores secrets or keys, and the lifecycle of the integration identity. An unattended service may suit JWT bearer or client credentials; an interactive tool needs a user-authorised flow. That choice deserves a proper design rather than a rushed substitution.

Where time permits, migrate once: replace SOAP login(), test the existing business operations with OAuth and remove the broad network exception. Where time does not permit, document the bridge, its owner and a dated migration milestone.

A practical plan for November and December

  • Now: inspect org- and profile-level IP ranges and identify SOAP login() evidence.
  • During November: assign each dependency to an owner, contact suppliers and test the release update in non-production.
  • Before 15 December: implement and verify a bridge for any sandbox dependency that cannot yet migrate.
  • Before 31 January: complete production remediation with monitoring, rollback criteria and business-owner sign-off.
  • Before Summer ’27: move remaining SOAP login() clients to an appropriate OAuth design.

This sequence is Ostrelis operational guidance, not an additional Salesforce schedule. Adjust it for change freezes and supplier lead times, while preserving enough time to observe a normal business cycle.

The Ostrelis view

The immediate technical test is narrow; the governance lesson is wider. A trusted IP range that covers millions of addresses and an integration that nobody owns are both signs that authentication exceptions have outlived their original decisions.

Use this change to remove unjustified ranges, name service owners and make authentication failures observable. Then plan the OAuth migration as an operational change covering credentials, permissions, monitoring and recovery—not simply a different endpoint.

Ostrelis can help investigate dependencies, coordinate suppliers and test a controlled migration through our Salesforce integration services, Salesforce administration and managed services. Need help getting prepared? Talk to a Salesforce expert.

Need help getting prepared?

Ostrelis can help assess whether this change affects your Salesforce environment, identify dependencies and plan the work needed to prepare safely.

Talk to a Salesforce expert

Sources

  1. SOAP API login() with a Broad IP Range Requires a Security Token — Salesforce Help (19 October 2026, accessed 2 November 2026)
  2. Platform SOAP API login() retirement — Salesforce Help (Current retirement guidance, accessed 2 November 2026)
  3. SOAP API login() retirement in versions 31.0–64.0—how to inventory and migrate integrations to OAuth — Salesforce Help (29 July 2026, accessed 2 November 2026)
  4. External Client Apps — Salesforce Help (Current product documentation, accessed 2 November 2026)